WAR-REPORT : Israel has likely defeated Hamas in Khan Younis and is in the process of doing so in Rafah. Hamas forces in both locations have suffered heavy attrition and are no longer operating as effective military units. Defeat occurs when an enemy force has “temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight” and is forced to yield to the friendly commander’s will. Defeating an enemy force is a much less resource- and time-intensive activity than destroying that force. Destroying an enemy force requires damaging it to such a degree that it can no longer function without being entirely rebuilt. Translating the defeat of Hamas’ brigades into the destruction of the organization will require additional Israeli or international measures to prevent Hamas from recovering.
Hamas organized a deliberate but ultimately unsuccessful defense against Israeli advances in Khan Younis during the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) first clearing operations there between December 2023 and April 2024. Hamas attacks targeting the IDF in Khan Younis in the summer of 2024 in contrast appeared opportunistic and lacked tactical sophistication. These attacks did not appear to pursue a coordinated campaign plan across multiple command echelons. The IDF’s public reporting corroborates this judgment.
The IDF’s media arm reported in July that the IDF did not encounter “significant resistance” when entering Khan Younis. This IDF report is consistent with the low rate of attacks in Khan Younis during July. Hamas only claimed 31 of the attacks that targeted Israeli forces in Khan Younis during July and August 2024, compared to 72 attacks during February and March. The Khan Younis Brigade also failed to execute one of its key missions — preventing the IDF from rescuing Israeli hostages — in the summer of 2024 when the IDF retrieved six Israeli hostage bodies from Khan Younis.
The decrease in Hamas’ effectiveness in Khan Younis during the summer of 2024 is consistent with the brigade commander’s own account of his forces’ ability. Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salameh reported to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in an undated letter authored before his death on July 13 that the brigade had suffered 50 percent casualties, with another 25 percent of its remaining fighters mentally or physically unfit for combat.
Salamah also wrote that the brigade had lost 60 percent of its small arms and between 65 and 70 percent of its anti-tank weapons. He wrote his letter prior to the new Israeli operations in Khan Younis in July, meaning that Hamas has almost certainly lost additional fighters and materiel in Khan Younis since he authored the letter. The brigade has similarly lost a series of top commanders — including Salamah — who will be difficult to replace. It does not appear that the Khan Younis Brigade’s subordinate commands can communicate with each other or with higher headquarters, given the lack of a coordinated defense against Israeli operations.
Hamas’ recent low rate of attacks and unsophisticated operations in Rafah indicate that the Rafah Brigade is severely degraded and is no longer operating as an effective military unit. The weekly rate of Hamas attacks in Rafah has steadily declined since the IDF entered Rafah in May 2024.
The attacks no longer appear to have clear tactical or operational objectives, suggesting a breakdown in command and control. IDF statements corroborate this assessment. Hamas fighters in Rafah have also failed to guard Israeli hostages, leading to the rescue of a living hostage and the retrieval of six hostage’s bodies this summer.
Hamas remnants in Khan Younis and Rafah could rebuild under the right circumstances, despite the brigades’ defeat. These remaining fighters will likely continue to conduct opportunistic attacks on Israeli forces if the IDF re-enters Khan Younis. These attacks will not be effective, however, unless a lifting of Israeli pressure affords Hamas the opportunity to rebuild its military organization.
The Khan Younis Brigade very likely does not have a functioning command structure or communication system and lacks the ability to train, arm, and redistribute forces. The IDF’s current air and ground operations restrict Hamas command centers from operating, small cells from receiving orders, and fighters from accessing stores of weapons from other areas of the Gaza Strip. A break in the IDF’s airstrikes and the free movement of goods and personnel around the Gaza Strip would enable the remaining fighters to conduct more effective and organized attacks on Israeli forces. The surviving Hamas fighters would act as the cadre that ensures continuity across the organization to rebuild its capacity to its previous levels.
